This appears to be the only good news so far. Sounds like the ROV managed to close the stack. Of course, that's not the end of the story, because some brave souls are going to have to perform a re-entry and complete the P&A operation. Which in itself won't be easy.
AK
This situation might have changed as per the following news articles, one of which was released an hour ago:-
Information or opinions are solely provided for educational and/or discussion purposes on an informal public forum and should not be interpreted as a recommendation for a specific treatment plan, course of action or product/ service. Use of any of this information does not replace consultations with qualified individuals in these respective fields.
Re: Transocean fire « Reply #51 on Apr 25, 2010, 2:26am »
I'm a little bit concerned that the proffessional HPHT engineers in the industry aren't offering their valued opinion. Other rigs are operating in HPHT conditions, and I'd expect a little more input from valued sources on the subject of the Horizons demise. It doesn't take a Government investigation to resolve issues that pertain to the industry NOW. Facts are what we need. Transocean, have all the details leading up to the event in the form of the equivalent of a 'Black Box'. We have 'online facts' which have not been disclosed yet. Don't let the Government, Transocean, or anyone else 'interfere' with the truthful conclusion. I suggest the details of the last 48 hours become public immediately, raw data, not the communication onboard which will never be retrievable. The Families of the deceased will want understanding of the circumstances in which their loved ones perished. Transocean have the details, and should make it available to the media, who need to present the details of the accident in language the public can understand. Presently, the media provides misguidance and misunderstanding. 11 drilling personnel have been lost. As a supervisor, I could not allow this scenario to occur on my rig. We shall make changes on our rig regarding drills as a result of the Horizon tragedy. We often learn, to our regret, from they who suffer. We're still oilmen, proud, ambitious, and enjoy the opportunity of a challenge, as a team (that football clubs could only dream of).
Re: Transocean fire « Reply #52 on Apr 25, 2010, 2:46am »
Speculation? Facts? What went wrong? How many plugs should be placed in a HPHT well before abandonment. How often are drillers convinced that '2 barriers' are established and all returns from the well can now be discharged to sea. Question: Were both barriers pressure tested? Is a third barrier considered necessary for such wells? The 'hurry' to move onto the next well may cause BP regret. The economics behind drilling a well is only final with its safe completion.
Joined: Jun 2003 Gender: Male Posts: 932 Location: PERTH WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Re: Transocean fire « Reply #53 on Apr 25, 2010, 3:39am »
It is easy to blame the operator and the corporate culture. The problem is with the supervisors, the individuals. What is required is a properly instituted 'Whistle blowers Page' Approved by the responsible organization, like OSHA in the US. A page where issues such as short-cuts ordered by the individual who is running the operations can be posted, anonymously, and a qualified group can ask the questions before the well blows out. Let me know if such a place exists. I am unaware of such a place. It could work through Well Control schools also.
Re: Transocean fire « Reply #54 on Apr 25, 2010, 6:30am »
What has happened has happened and there is nothing you or I can do about it, the loss of so many good people will always remain with us, however we must not get away from the basics of what has happened here that being:
If this was a blowout as it is now being classed how could?
A formation influx entered the well bore and migrated to surface where it exploded without being detected, monitoring systems installed on today’s rigs are so temperamental that they will pick up one or two stroke differential, flow line indicators are much the same, pit volume indicators are linked into other impendent system as well as the rigs monitoring systems.
As we all know from our well control training a volume of gas will double in size as it travails half the distance up the well bore such action repeat itself every half the distance from then onwards as such as an influx gets close to surface there is a rapid expansion in un-controllable volume,
As most of the people lost were part of the drilling crew I believe this to have been the case,
It is easy to blame the operator and the corporate culture. The problem is with the supervisors, the individuals.
I am not alluding to BP or Transocean and won't hesitate to do so if I got the facts with me but BP still remains the most responsible client in my book and Transocean is definitely no mickey mouse outfit....fact though which goes without mentioning, is something nasty went wrong.
The problem is with individuals who have always loathed working on rigs, marked time and eventually made it to a desk job in town. And trust me there are lots of these cut and paste bozos who have thoroughly infiltrated the ranks since the early 90s.
It is the few genuinely able ones who hold the fort both in town and at the rig but they eventually succumb to burn out and/or forced to leave for political or insurance premium related reasons. They are seen as a threat. Currently due to the recent boom crappy supervisors outnumber the really good ones (the type who would be the last to abandon the rig).
In one case a 16.2 bbl water chaser was included with cement ops from town. When the supervisor objectively questioned it over speaker phone he was ridiculed in front to all other supervisors on board during the morning meeting by the head honcho in town - Fat guy with low blood sugar morning sickness. It should have been 1.6 bbl water spacer. 16.2 barrels would have certainly under balanced the annular clearance between the outside of the casing and the open hole for a 9 5/8" csg vs 12.25" OH even if the pore pressure was +0.01 above normal.
With regard though to the DWH incident there is this notion that if the well was shut in time be it by the driller, hot stabbed by the ROV or by default when the rig got disconnected from the sub sea BOP.....flow would stop. True, but only for a period of time. Because the trapped influx, most of the time associated with gas, will slowly migrate upwards on its own accord due to its lighter density and increase pent up pressure to a point when the weakest point -usually the cement at the shoe - is breached and gas will migrate up on the outside and a blowout will once again ensue.
Shutting in a well in time only buys us time to kill it. But how much time it buys depends on quite a few factors...pressure is one of them. It will eventually blow again if we don't kill it in time.
Due to the gap in experience, new technology such as Deepwater & ERD drilling, Well control courses should double the time for course duration especially for combined surface and subsea ie: 5 days for surface and another 5 days for subsea and possibly another 5 for HPHT which must be made mandatory.
No disrespect to next of kin who have lost loved ones but I will keep working on rigs - disasters such as this and ones involving choppers do scare me but this fear will be my guide. What I get totally terrified of are the con artists that hold responsible positions. The latest one I encountered about a month ago could not handle a scientific calculator just for Arithmetic and non Mathematical purposes- he insisted on one that only has +, -, =, /. When his screen mentioned "Please Enter Password".....He typed in "P-A-S-S-W-O-R-D", and yes he was a bloody day supervisor on board and the Nightman had to slog throughout the entire stint.
Information or opinions are solely provided for educational and/or discussion purposes on an informal public forum and should not be interpreted as a recommendation for a specific treatment plan, course of action or product/ service. Use of any of this information does not replace consultations with qualified individuals in these respective fields.
Re: Transocean fire « Reply #56 on Apr 25, 2010, 9:20am »
If there will be the possibility to analyze raw data, it will appear clear that well was talking to them by giving indications of a kick and the incident will be attribuited to a series of human errors: it will be the right conclusion but at the same time will be the WRONG one.
As now we only now few details (TD, production string cemented, shoe track not drilled out, P&A in progress, and kick developped when mud into the riser was displaced into sea water) and many other such as MW, Influx gradient, rock permeability, depth of influx, are unknown. We also don't know if BOPs had beed shut or not.
The rig was a 5th generation semi working successfully for several years with, I image, experienced crews and supervisors. Along with the well cemented up, it was a potentially safe status.
The scenario I'm guessing is a poor cement bond in the annulus and a gas cushion that accumulated below well head. May be seal assembly lost its seal and when the hydrostatic was reduced by displacing the riser, the gas moved up so fast giving no chances no time for any action on the rig floor. Its ignition at surface made the tragedy.
Re: Transocean fire « Reply #57 on Apr 25, 2010, 9:48am »
Generically speaking, if a seal is breached in one of the BOP rams the high pressured gas could work its way to the koomey unit which if kicked in to energize or actuate a set of rams would create under compression heated gas. Like wise if the kick was through drill pipe up an opened FOSV with a dart above it, and the dart gives way under pressure, the pressured gas will work its way to the pumps. Put simply diesel engine scenario ! - the pumps and/or the koomey unit will blow up.
Information or opinions are solely provided for educational and/or discussion purposes on an informal public forum and should not be interpreted as a recommendation for a specific treatment plan, course of action or product/ service. Use of any of this information does not replace consultations with qualified individuals in these respective fields.
Re: Transocean fire « Reply #58 on Apr 25, 2010, 12:02pm »
I don't know, but it is very unlikely that gas came up the drill pipes as a float valve was surely in the string, the shoe track hadn't been drilled out and a cement plug was set...
A blowout througout the operating fluid line is also unlike to happen for few reasons: 1) in deepwater applications, the operating fluid is not going directly from surface koomey to rams; 2) so many check and shuttle valves are in the circuit; 3)lines are always under pressure and pressures monitored.
Joined: Jun 2003 Gender: Male Posts: 932 Location: PERTH WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Re: Transocean fire « Reply #59 on Apr 25, 2010, 1:41pm »
I heard that the cement job was poor. The seal was not tested before they switched over to sea water in the riser. That would not explain why the blind shear and the Hydril could not be closed. That they went with the ROV indicates to me that they had disconnected the control system. The testing of everything before you consider it redundant is how things should be done. I do not hear a lot about 'inflow' tests any more. Are they still considered?
Re: Transocean fire « Reply #60 on Apr 25, 2010, 1:50pm »
The threat of a major oil spill off the coast of Louisiana grew significantly Saturday as a leak was discovered in the oil well that was the site last week of a catastrophic accident that sank a huge drilling rig and likely killed 11 workers.
The spill, which a day earlier Coast Guard officials had thought was contained within a 16-square-mile area on the surface, now covers 400 square miles, and may grow as the well spews 42,000 more gallons of oil per day at the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico, Coast Guard Rear Adm. Mary Landry said Saturday.
"This is a very serious spill," she said at a news conference updating the situation.
Word of the expanding spill came as the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig was found capsized and lying on the sea floor about 1,500 feet northwest of the well, located roughly 40 miles off the coast of Louisiana, the Coast Guard said.
Robot submarines discovered oil shooting from the end of the pipe-like riser that had connected the rig to the well at the ocean sea floor.
Doug Suttles, chief operating officer for BP exploration and production, said while the Coast Guard works to clean up oil at the water's surface, the company has mobilized some 700 employees and contractors to figure out a solution for sealing the well at the sea floor.
Rough seas, rain and winds temporarily halted cleanup efforts Saturday. Storms produced 8- to 10-foot waves, forcing the Coast Guard to call ashore five oil-skimming boats, three work barges and five planes that had been releasing chemicals to disperse the oil in the water, said Petty Officer John Edwards.
« Last Edit: Apr 25, 2010, 1:55pm by Adminstrator »
Re: Transocean fire « Reply #61 on Apr 25, 2010, 2:40pm »
I do not hear a lot about 'inflow' tests any more. Are they still considered?
Was talk of inflow test being conducted at some stage of this operation at some point. As a Toolpusher for Transocean on the DWF drillship, we still carry these tests out. So yes they are still done.
« Last Edit: Apr 25, 2010, 2:43pm by grunterhunter »
Information or opinions are solely provided for educational and/or discussion purposes on an informal public forum and should not be interpreted as a recommendation for a specific treatment plan, course of action or product/ service. Use of any of this information does not replace consultations with qualified individuals in these respective fields.
Speculation? Facts? What went wrong? How many plugs should be placed in a HPHT well before abandonment. How often are drillers convinced that '2 barriers' are established and all returns from the well can now be discharged to sea. Question: Were both barriers pressure tested? Is a third barrier considered necessary for such wells? The 'hurry' to move onto the next well may cause BP regret. The economics behind drilling a well is only final with its safe completion.
Hold on, guys...
What's all this HPHT stuff? The so-far published data says the well blew out at 6000 psi. Given the depth, that doesn't count as HPHT in my book. If that's what's called HPHT these days, I might start responding positively to some of the job offers I get.
Information or opinions are solely provided for educational and/or discussion purposes on an informal public forum and should not be interpreted as a recommendation for a specific treatment plan, course of action or product/ service. Use of any of this information does not replace consultations with qualified individuals in these respective fields.
Re: Transocean fire « Reply #64 on Apr 25, 2010, 9:04pm »
The driller has complete control of the well, assisted by data engineers. Any driller who accepts that Pit volume indicators are not working is prepared to run 'blind'. Any Toolpusher who tells his Driller to proceed without 'volume control' is taking a risk. My mesage to Toolpushers and Drillers is simple: Take the downtime and ensure a safe well. The big question still remains: Was the cement job and any other Plugs pressure tested? More importantly, were the plugs inflow tested? Inflow testing is a very common procedure in subsea completion of Christmas Trees and DHSVs. Surely, it is required in HPHT wells. One of your earlier commentators mentioned BP's focus on WOC, and I have to agree with the comment that their overall interests may be unsound, due to focus on issues outside the main agenda. As Drilling Contractors, We want to drill the wells efficiently while maintaining our workforce in 100% safe working environment. Our 'culture' must change to reflect the fact that barriers are adhered to. 'Culture' is the most important word in the offshore industry at the present time. A roustabout should practice the same culture as the OIM or Toolpusher. Are all barriers in place? Obviously, barriers were not in place on the 'Horizon'. Perhaps, the planning was at fault. Two pressure tested barriers in a well are of paramount importance.
It is easy to blame the operator and the corporate culture. The problem is with the supervisors, the individuals. What is required is a properly instituted 'Whistle blowers Page' Approved by the responsible organization, like OSHA in the US. A page where issues such as short-cuts ordered by the individual who is running the operations can be posted, anonymously, and a qualified group can ask the questions before the well blows out. Let me know if such a place exists. I am unaware of such a place. It could work through Well Control schools also.
Although my login data only has me as a member of this site since last October, I've been on it since year 2000. I 'logged off' in 2004, and have only recently rejoined, with a different pseudonym.
However, if the above message (I speak as a Drilling Supervisor with 32 years' oilfield experience under my belt), is the conventional wisdom pertaining to the correspondents, I think I may log off again. I've never read so much bull in my life.
Information or opinions are solely provided for educational and/or discussion purposes on an informal public forum and should not be interpreted as a recommendation for a specific treatment plan, course of action or product/ service. Use of any of this information does not replace consultations with qualified individuals in these respective fields.
It is easy to blame the operator and the corporate culture. The problem is with the supervisors, the individuals. What is required is a properly instituted 'Whistle blowers Page' Approved by the responsible organization, like OSHA in the US. A page where issues such as short-cuts ordered by the individual who is running the operations can be posted, anonymously, and a qualified group can ask the questions before the well blows out. Let me know if such a place exists. I am unaware of such a place. It could work through Well Control schools also.
I've never read so much bull in my life.
AK
The proposal of Holdril doesn't make me ashame at all and I support it, as an experienced Drilling Spv.
It is easy to blame the operator and the corporate culture. The problem is with the supervisors, the individuals.
Shutting in a well in time only buys us time to kill it. But how much time it buys depends on quite a few factors...pressure is one of them. It will eventually blow again if we don't kill it in time.
Pupjoint, You write a lot of wise stuff on this site, but unfortunately the above quote is simply not true. Assuming, that is, that the shut-in kick pressure does not exceed the weakest part of your hole (usually the most recently placed casing shoe formation pressure, dependent upon current mud weight, commonly known as MAASP), nor the pressure rating of your surface equipment. I am worried about the way this thread is heading, given the seriousness of its initial header, regarding the grim DWH disaster. Because people are coming out quoting basic Well Control School stuff, but with no real knowledge so far as to what happened. And personally, I'm one of those people who has still got to go through Well Control School every two years, paying for it myself, which isn't cheap. The only value of IWCF is to give one a little jolt, and see what their new exam will be like, because no real-life kick situation is anything like those seen on the simulator. Or rather, very few. And those that are become really boring. Get it shut in, you've got all the time in the world: or rather that which your head office will allow you. I was happy the last time I had what was a serious well-control event, to be working for an understanding and small independent company. It took ten days and a few million dollars to get things back to normal, but the only real pressure I was looking at was downhole, not corporate.
But the people on the DWH obviously didn't even have time to shut in. Or maybe they were too busy performing the displacement of the riser to seawater (and who's looking at the flo-sho at that time?) to notice that the well was coming at them?
No, I'm not going to speculate. But I do ask myself one question. If they were WOC, and simply displacing the riser during that time, why was the BOP open
Information or opinions are solely provided for educational and/or discussion purposes on an informal public forum and should not be interpreted as a recommendation for a specific treatment plan, course of action or product/ service. Use of any of this information does not replace consultations with qualified individuals in these respective fields.
Shutting in a well in time only buys us time to kill it. But how much time it buys depends on quite a few factors...pressure is one of them. It will eventually blow again if we don't kill it in time.
Pupjoint, You write a lot of wise stuff on this site, but unfortunately the above quote is simply not true.
Ok so I am wise guy. To date I have not met an accident on the road and I have been driving all over the world since the 60s. It could happen tomorrow. But if a traffic cop were to follow me non stop for 2 or 3 hours, sooner or later he will find a legit technical excuse to issue me a ticket. Lots of my previous posts at this forum are full of holes. I have not gone back and edited them except for typos or grammar. Instead I hope others will challenge them - and get the discussion going, much better than surreptitiously inciting discussion.
Assuming, that is, that the shut-in kick pressure does not exceed the weakest part of your hole (usually the most recently placed casing shoe formation pressure, dependent upon current mud weight, commonly known as MAASP), nor the pressure rating of your surface equipment.
A dangerous assumption. Gas migrates, even faster in seawater compared to mud. It does not expand if shut it but the hydrostatic column of mud beneath it will be reduced. MAASP might not be exceeded at the point of shut in but surely will in time if the influx is predominantly gas and sections of the well were subject to high losses (ie: good porosity & permeability)
Get it shut in, you've got all the time in the world:
I find this statement real scary. Perhaps it might be an idea to go back into another period of hibernation
But the people on the DWH obviously didn't even have time to shut in. Or maybe they were too busy performing the displacement of the riser to seawater (and who's looking at the flo-sho at that time?) to notice that the well was coming at them?
There are reports of an explosion at 07:00 pm preceding the one that was followed by evac.
No, I'm not going to speculate. But I do ask myself one question. If they were WOC, and simply displacing the riser during that time, why was the BOP open
I think you are not alone asking this question. But I believe those guys who died were most likely fighting to fix something to the last. minutes of their lives. So out of respect for them I will leave this a question but just for now out of respect for the living.
Information or opinions are solely provided for educational and/or discussion purposes on an informal public forum and should not be interpreted as a recommendation for a specific treatment plan, course of action or product/ service. Use of any of this information does not replace consultations with qualified individuals in these respective fields.
Information or opinions are solely provided for educational and/or discussion purposes on an informal public forum and should not be interpreted as a recommendation for a specific treatment plan, course of action or product/ service. Use of any of this information does not replace consultations with qualified individuals in these respective fields.
Re: Transocean fire « Reply #71 on Apr 26, 2010, 11:19am »
April 26 (Bloomberg) -- BP Plc said it may take as long as three months to drill a well to stop an oil spill in deep seas in the Gulf of Mexico after a rig caught fire and sank last week in what may be the deadliest U.S. platform blast in 42 years.
BP and Swiss drilling contractor, Transocean Ltd., began using remote-controlled vehicles yesterday to try to activate a blowout valve to halt the 1,000 barrel-a-day leak. If the valve isn’t activated the companies may need to drill a second well to intercept the leakage and inject a heavy fluid to prevent oil or gas from escaping, London-based BP said in a statement.
“The relief well as described could take several months,” Doug Suttles, BP’s chief operating officer of exploration and production, said in a teleconference yesterday.
BP Chief Executive Officer Tony Hayward has spent his first three years in charge restoring the company’s reputation for safety following a fatal explosion at the Texas City refinery in 2005. A search for 11 workers missing since the rig sinking has been suspended. The accident may cost insurers and reinsurers $1.6 billion, according to an estimate by JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Activating the blowout valve could take 24 to 36 hours, Suttles said yesterday. Transocean is shipping two rigs to help stop the leak, with the first scheduled to arrive today and the second May 2.
Rough Seas
Oil is leaking out in two places at the site, said David Nicholas, a spokesman in London for BP, which is responsible for the cleanup. Thunderstorms, rain and rough seas are hampering efforts to clean up the spillage, according to a statement yesterday from the Coast Guard, BP and Transocean.
With more than 1,000 people working on the operation, costs total “several million dollars” so far, said Coast Guard Rear Admiral Mary Landry, who is overseeing the rescue and cleanup.
The spill, about 30 miles (50 kilometers) from the coast, won’t reach a shoreline within the next three days, said Charlie Henry, a scientific support coordinator with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration during a teleconference yesterday. It’s unknown when the well can be capped, she said.
In some sensitive areas, Louisiana state authorities have begun installing booms, a type of floating net used to trap and gather any spilled oil on the water, as a precaution. Of the 600 square mile spill, 97 percent is considered oil sheen, or thin layer, above the water.
Re: Transocean fire « Reply #72 on Apr 26, 2010, 7:31pm »
"Assuming, that is, that the shut-in kick pressure does not exceed the weakest part of your hole (usually the most recently placed casing shoe formation pressure, dependent upon current mud weight, commonly known as MAASP), nor the pressure rating of your surface equipment.
A dangerous assumption. Gas migrates, even faster in seawater compared to mud. It does not expand if shut it but the hydrostatic column of mud beneath it will be reduced. MAASP might not be exceeded at the point of shut in but surely will in time if the influx is predominantly gas and sections of the well were subject to high losses (ie: good porosity & permeability)
Get it shut in, you've got all the time in the world:
I find this statement real scary. Perhaps it might be an idea to go back into another period of hibernation "
PJ,
Absolutely. I was talking through my hat. Or rather, I expressed myself very badly. Possibly due to the fact that I'm currently 'hibernating', as you put it!
You are quite correct in what you say about gas expansion, and I was in no way suggesting that you can just shut in a kick and then go and play poker for the rest of the day while head office decides what you should do. Far from it. That increasing casing pressure can come and bite you back, bigtime.
But this is not always the case. Maybe I'm just nit-picking, but the most important thing is the Driller recognising that a kick is in progress, and shutting the well in pdq. At that point, you might not have 'all the time in the world' as I stupidly put it, but you've got immeasurably more time to figure out a solution to the problem than if the BOP is still open. I've been in situations where the Driller has shut in, someone's come running to wake me up, and we subsequently establish that it was a lot of fuss about nothing, like the mud being out of balance. But in such circumstances I've never reprimanded anyone, because the guy was doing his job, and correctly, even though his action may have caused extra time and expenditure.
I think my previous post (and others on this thread) may have been slightly coloured by the fact that on a recent job we had a completely unexpected well-control situation, where immediately on shut-in (which was quickly performed) the casing pressure exceeded shoe FIT pressure (aka MAASP) by more than 100%. Now that was scary. Took ten days and a lot of the client's money to sort that one out.
I think it's just seeing the disturbing pictures of the DWH makes me jumpy, and thinking "there, but for the grace of God (or rather a freaky bit of geological luck) went we".
Information or opinions are solely provided for educational and/or discussion purposes on an informal public forum and should not be interpreted as a recommendation for a specific treatment plan, course of action or product/ service. Use of any of this information does not replace consultations with qualified individuals in these respective fields.
The driller has complete control of the well, assisted by data engineers. Any driller who accepts that Pit volume indicators are not working is prepared to run 'blind'. Any Toolpusher who tells his Driller to proceed without 'volume control' is taking a risk. My mesage to Toolpushers and Drillers is simple: Take the downtime and ensure a safe well. The big question still remains: Was the cement job and any other Plugs pressure tested? More importantly, were the plugs inflow tested? Inflow testing is a very common procedure in subsea completion of Christmas Trees and DHSVs. Surely, it is required in HPHT wells. One of your earlier commentators mentioned BP's focus on WOC, and I have to agree with the comment that their overall interests may be unsound, due to focus on issues outside the main agenda. As Drilling Contractors, We want to drill the wells efficiently while maintaining our workforce in 100% safe working environment. Our 'culture' must change to reflect the fact that barriers are adhered to. 'Culture' is the most important word in the offshore industry at the present time. A roustabout should practice the same culture as the OIM or Toolpusher. Are all barriers in place? Obviously, barriers were not in place on the 'Horizon'. Perhaps, the planning was at fault. Two pressure tested barriers in a well are of paramount importance.
Alcor,
I agree with this 100%, except in one respect, that being the first phrase. The Driller SHOULD have complete control of the well, ASSISTED by data engineers. However, in reality, how often is that the case?
I still have a copy of an article from the SPE review entitled 'The Disenfranchised Driller', published in 1991. The article talked about the way in which (most specifically referring to the technological advances of the 1980's), the rôle of the Driller had been usurped by 'data engineers': it drew a parallel with the aviation industry, stating that the position of the Driller was now (unfortunately) rather like that of being an airline pilot whose actions were being dictated to him by a bunch of 'specialists' seated in closed areas at the back of the plane. And who hadn't adequately explained to him exactly what it was they were doing back there.
It's unfortunate, but all too frequently the case, even now.
I spent a long part of my career on the brake. And that article struck a very familiar chord with me, which is why I kept it.
On every job I do, I make a point when chatting to the Driller in the doghouse of telling him that he's the Most Important Man on the Rig. More important than the Rig Manager, more important than myself, the Company Man. It usually raises a few eyebrows, and leads to some interesting conversation, if there's time.
Try it.
AK
PS Doesn't always go down too well if the Toolpusher's present at the same time, but that's tough!
Information or opinions are solely provided for educational and/or discussion purposes on an informal public forum and should not be interpreted as a recommendation for a specific treatment plan, course of action or product/ service. Use of any of this information does not replace consultations with qualified individuals in these respective fields.
The proposal of Holdril doesn't make me ashame at all and I support it, as an experienced Drilling Spv.
I take it from your response that you'll therefore be volunteering to be a member of this self-professed, third-party, economically disinterested, 'qualified group' who the Driller / Rig Manager / Company Man is supposed to rouse and convene in the middle of the night while their own companies are calling Boots and Coots? It's an utterly absurd conception. I'd prefer to call Greenpeace.
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